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CITY OF VERNON, .Appellant, v. CI'l'Y OF
LOS ANGBLES. H('spondent.
Streets-Sewers-Actions-Judgment.-~In

an action by the
of Los
for declaratory
of contracts for disposal of
for negligence in Los
Angeles' attempts to dispose of sewuge, a determination that
it was decided in a prior abatement action by the state againBt
both cities that Vernon had no rights against Los Angeles
under the sewage disposal contracts was erroneous and contrary to the language of the District Court of Appeal in
affirming the abatement injunction that the trial court correctly refrained from passing on any of the rights, obligations
or liabilities affecting the cities by reason of their contractual
relations with each other, and also contrary to the language
of the Supreme Court pointing out that the prior decision
required that the cities should settle or litigate their contractual rights independently of compliance with the injunction decree.
[2a, 2b] Id.- Sewers- Contracts- Impracticability of Performance.-In an action by the city of Vernon against the city of
Los Angeles for specific performance of contracts for disposal
of Vernon's sewage and for other relief, determinations by
the trial court that a prior abatement action against both
cities required Los Angeles to build a new screening plant
and a tube at a cost of approximately $41,000,000, that the
cost of operating and maintaining the new plant would be
approximately $500,000 per annum, that Los Angeles could not
continue performance under its contracts with Vernon except
at excessive and unreasonable cost, and that it was not practicable for Los Angeles to continue performance under the
terms of the contract with the use of the new plant and
tube supported the position of Los Angeles that further
performance under such contracts by it was excused, since
the parties contemplated that there would be available for
legal use disposal facilities, whether those in existence or to
be constructed, the cost of which would not be disproportionate
to the costs expressly referred to in such contTacts.
[3] Contracts-Performance-Excuses for Nonperformance-Impossibility.-A contract is impossible of performance in legal
of Vernon
for

the

[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Contracts § 238 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts,
§ 363.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] Streets, § 463; [2] Streets,
§ 458; [3] Contracts, § 234.
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when it can only
when it is not
be done at an excessive or unrensonable cost.
[4] Streets-Sewers-Actions-Judgment.-In an action by the
city of Vernon against the city of Los Angeles for specific
performance of contracts for
of Vernon's sewage
and for other
the effect of a
that such contracts were "terminated" and were
was not to determine that when performance
ticable the eontracts were
what performance had already
since such determination would be
that certain described "facilities and
created under
the contracts could and should be
where the judgment expressly contemplated an adjustment of prior obligations.
[5] Id.-Sewers-Actions-Remedies.-A cause of action by the
city of Vernon against the city of Los Angeles for damages
in the amount which Vernon was required to pay under a
prior abatement judgment in return for its use of the Los
Angeles disposal facilities, based on the theory that the negligent failure of Los Angeles to perform its contractual duty
to keep its sewage disposal facilities in good condition and
carry away the sewage of Vernon was the proximate cause
of the abatement judgment against Vern on, could not be
maintained where performance of such duty was excused
due to excessive and unreasonable expense.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William ,J. Palmer, ,Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief, for specific performance of
contracts, and for damages for negligence. Judg·ment for
defendant affirmed.
Carson B. Hubbard, City Attorney, Edward R. Young,
John F. O'Hara and John W. Slwnk III for Appellant.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones and John L.
Flynn, Assistant City Attorneys, and Weldon L. Weber,
Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-The city of Vernon by its complaint for
declaratory relief and injunction seeks a determination that
under contracts entered into between it and defendant city of
Los Angeles in 1909, 1925, 1931, and 1938 it is entitled to discharge a certain amount of its sc>vage through the sewer system
of Los Angeles without payment to Los Angeles; Vern on also
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tions that the contracts are without effect
required to finance its share of the cost of new sewage disposal facilities built
Los
in accordance with the
Los Angeles (1948),
decision for the state in
supra, 83 Cal
627 ; and
Vernon has no right to use
on payment of its
the sewage
of Los
share of the cost of the facilities used.
After trial the superior court decreed that Vernon is not entitled to the relief sought; that the contracts between Vern on
and Los Angeles (except for certain salvageable elements) are
terminated and ''have been invalid and unenforceable sinct·
a time not later than the entry of ... judgment in the State
Abatement Action''; and that Vernon is entitled to use the
new facilities only on payment of its share of their cost.
Vern on has
It contends that the decision of the
superior court is based upon the erroneous determination that
the decree in the abatement action (People v. City of Los
Angeles (1948), supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489])
decided against Vern on the issues raised in this action as to
its contracts with Los
\Ve have concluded that although such determination of the trial court is erroneous, its
judgment can and should be
on the basis of its further
determination that the performance of the contracts was excused and the contracts were
because performance
became impossible except at impractical, excessive, unreasonable expense not contemplated by the parties when the contracts were made.

The Effect of the Abatement Decree
The determination of the trial court in this action that the
essential issues herein were finally decided against Vern on in
the abatement action is a serious error which, as is hereinafter
explained, involves an attempt to rewrite or disregard a substantial portion of a final judgment of the superior court and
opinions of a District Court of Appeal and of this court. Although this error dors not require reversal, discussion of it in
connection with the background of this action will aid understanding of the present controversy.
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Years ago c1t1es
other than Los Angeles and sanitation districts in the Los
Angeles area ·which subsequently became defendants in tbe
abatement action found themselves
unable to con
struct
sewage disposal faeilities. The
of Los
.c'tngeles had constructed an outfall sewer
with a capacity which exceeded its then
neNls.
in
1909 with V crnon, the cities other than lJos
and tlH'
sanitation districts made contracts with I~os
by which
I.;os Angeles agreed to dispose of their sevntge. "[T)he eontracts between the city of r_.os Angeles and the other municipalities and sanitation districts under discussion were for an
indefinite period, or, in some instances, for the life of the
outfall sewer system itself, and in no instance carried any
provision permitting the contracts to be cancelled when or if
the city of Los Angeles required the use of that
of the
capacity of its outfall sewer system covered by the abovementioned contracts" (p. 631 of 83 Cal.App.2d).
Sewage was originally disposed of by Los Angeles under
its 1909 contract with Vernon by transporting it through an
outfall sewer to Hypcrion and diseharging it raw into Santa
Monica Bay about 900 fe0t oft'shore. In HJ22, pursuant to
requirements of the State Departmmt of Public Health, Los
Angeles commenced construction of new facilities, induding
a screening plant and a submarine tube extending about a
mile offshore at Hyperion. These faciliti<'s wf'l'e operated
under a permit issued to Los Angeles in 1923.
In 1940, because r_.os Angeles had violated the terms of the
1923 permit and created a nuisance, the state suspended the
permit; however, it granted a temporary permit on condition
that IJOS Angelrs at once prepare plans for the construction
and financing of adequate sewage
works. Los Angeles did not comply with the terms of the temporary permit
and the state revoked such permit. It also revoked permits
of other defendants, including Vernon. Thus all rights of the
contracting partiPS to dispose of sewage throu§!h +hp existing
facilities were terminated.
In 1943 the state brought the abatement action. Judgment
for the state was entered on ll'ebruary 1, 1946, and afi1rmcd
in People v. City of Los Angeles (1948), supra, 83 Cal.App.2d
627. This court denied a hearing, and th~ Unitrd Statrs
Supreme Court denied certiorari (335 U.S. 852 [69 S.Ct. 80,
93 L.Ed. 400]).
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Both before and after the institution of the abatement action
Los .Angeles attempted to work out means, alone or in cooperation with the other cities, whereby the sewage could be adequately disposed of by methods conforming with health and
safety laws. Vernon did not make similar efforts; it sat by,
resting on its claim that all its responsibility for disposition of
its sewage, including its responsibility to the People of the
State of California, had been assumed by Los .Angeles.
Through the years the pressing need for continued and improved disposition of sewage increased with the increase of
the volume of sewage originating in the cities which used the
Los .Angeles facilities, including, as found by the trial court,
''the enormous increase in volume of sewage originating in the
City of Vern on as a result of the greatly increased industrial
activity within its boundaries."
.After certiorari to review the abatement injunction was
denied, Vernon, having elected to use the Los .Angeles system,
did not, as required by the injunction, report what steps it
had taken to comply with the portion of the injunction which
required it to arrange to finance its share of the cost of the
new plant; instead, it reported its reasons for having taken no
steps to comply with that portion of the injunction. It claimed
that it was unable to understand the decree, although other
cities had been able to understand and comply with its terms.
In the abatement action the trial court determined that Los
.Angeles had plans for an acceptable new plant to be built at
Hyperion; that it would be to the best interests of all defendants to dispose of their sewage through such new plant although it would be possible for some of the defendants other
than Los .Angeles, including Vernon, to make arrangements at
great expense to dispose of their sewage without using the
facilities of Los .Angeles. The judgment ordered that Los
.Angeles build a new plant of sufficient capacity to abate the
nuisance; that each other defendant either provide its own
facilities for disposing of its sewage in a safe and sanitary
manner or arrange to finance its share of the cost of the new
plant proportionate to gallonage allotted to it; that such other
defendants notify the court of the manner in which they
elected to comply with the abatement injunction. The decree
provided for continuing supervision by the court. Vernon
elected to dispose of its sewage through the new facilities to be
built by Los .Angeles but did not make arrangements to finance
its share of the cost of such facilities until it was compelled
to do so by contempt proceedings (see City of Vernon v. St~
perior Court (1952), 38 Ca1.2d 509 [241 P.2d 243] ).

Dec. 1955]

CITY OF VERNON

v. CJTY oF Los ANGELES

715

[45 C.2d 710; 200 P.2d 841]

As previously indicated, in the
action defendant Los
Angeles takes the position and the trial court determined that
it had been decided in the abatement action that Vernon has
no rights against I-'os Angeles under the sewage disposal contracts which are the subject of the present action. The answer
filed by Vernon in the abatement action denied the allegations
Vernon of the state's complaint, set forth the contracts
of 1909, 1925, 1931, and 1938 with Los Angeles, and alleged
Vernon's position that under the contracts Los Angeles agreed
to keep its sewer system in good condition; that upon delivery
of Vernon sewage into the I.1os Angeles system Los Angeles
had sole responsibility for its sanitary disposal; that Los
Angeles alone was responsible for the nuisance and for the
construction at its sole expense of facilities to abate it.
[1] 'rhe superior court in its findings of fact in the present
action purports to determine ''that the issues created by the denials and affirmative allegations set forth in the answer of the
City of Vernon [in the abatement case] were unavoidably and
unequivocally before the court in said case . . . and by the
judgment entered in that case, were judicially determined
by the court against the City of Vern on.'' The relevant facts
are, however, that at the trial of the abatement action the
court refused to admit the contracts between Vernon and Los
Angeles in evidence, and the findings and judgment in the
abatement action did not refer to the particular issues there
and here raised by Vernon as to its rights under the contracts.
The conclusions of law in the abatement action contained the
following statements which relate to the contracts: Each city
has the primary duty to dispose of its sewage in a safe and
sanitary manner; none of the defendants is released from such
duty by any permission or right created by contract, ordinance, or otherwise; ''regardless of past relationships or contractual or other rights, privileges or obligations between the
various defendants," the state is entitled to an injunction restraining defendants from maintaining sewage works without
a permit and from discharging sewage into the bay in a man-i
ner which would create a nuisance.
It is apparent from the findings, conclusions, and judgment
in the abatement action that the trial court there decided that
Vern on's contracts with I.Jos Angeles were no defense in that
action but that it did not purport to decide what contractual
rights Vernon might have against I.1os Angeles apart from the
abatement action. On the appeal of Vernon and others in the
abatement action the District Court of Appeal made it clear
that such was the effect of the abatement injunction so far as
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were concerned. It
, "the court rightfully refrained from ""'"'"'-'"' upon any of the rights, obligations or
the various defendants by reason of their
liabilities
cow'""'n" with each other, and left those matters
open for future adjudication in a proper proceeding. Although the aforesaid contracts concerned the disposal of
sewage, the court would not be justified in this action to
adjudicate the rights existing between the various appellants
by reason of their contracts one with the other. Insofar as
the judgment herein is concerned, if any of the appellants
have any rights against the city of Los Angeles, or vice versa,
by reason of any existing contract, such rights have been preserved and may be enforced in a proper action.''
After the affirmance of the abatement injunction and the
denial of a hearing and of certiorari, Vernon instituted the
present action. It did not take steps, by levy of taxes or issuance of bonds or imposition of charges, to raise funds for payment of its share of the cost of the new sewage plant, and it
was found guilty of contempt for failing to comply with the
abatement injunction. It sought review of the contempt
judgment, contending, among other things, that bringing the
present action was compliance with the injunction. This
court rejected that contention and affirmed the contempt
judgment. (City of Vernon v. Superior Court (1952), supra,
38 Cal.2d 509, 518.) We said, "The obvious purpose of the
injunction was to get the nuisance promptly abated and to
that end to get the new plant built and paid for without the
delay attendant on independent or later ensuing litigation to
determine the validity and effect of the old contracts of Vernon
and other corporate defendants." This court then quoted the>
language of the District Court of Appeal which is quoted in
the preceding paragraph and said of that language and of
the superior court ruling there under discussion, ''This ruling
preserves to petitioners all contractual rights they may possess
under the mentioned contracts but likewise it requires them
to settle or litigate those rights independently of compliance
with the injunction decree" (p. 519 of 38 CaL2d).
It therefore appears that the determination of the trial
court in the present action that the abatement injunction decided adversely to Vernon the questions of its contractual
rights against Los Angeles is erroneous and contrary to the
clear language of the District Court of Appeal in affirming
the injunction and of this court in upholding the determination that Vernon was in contempt.
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Legal
As a further ground of decision the trial court determined
that there was available to Los Angeles the defense of impossibility-not literal impossibility, but
due to
Land
excessive and unreasonable
Co. v. Howard (1916), 172
L.R.A.
1916F 1] Rest., Contracts, § 454. For the reasons hereinafter
stated, we conclude that this determination of the trial court
is tenable.
Pursuant to the 1909 agreement Los Angeles built within
Vernon and connected to the Los Angeles disposal system a
main sewer and a lateral sewer for the joint use of the two
cities. By that contract Los Angeles agrees to operate and
maintain the joint sewers and Vern on agrees to pay 5 per
cent of the cost of operation and maintenance. Each city
agrees to operate and maintain its own sewer system at its
own expense, ''other than those portions which are constructed
and used by them jointly. . . . [I]n consideration of the construction of the [joint] sewers above named, by the City of
Los Angeles at its own cost and expense, and of the connection
of said sewers with the outfall sewer also constructed by the
said City of Los Angeles [for discharge of sewage into the
bay] and of the privilege of connecting the sewer system to be
constructed hereafter by the said City of Vern on with said
sewers, and of discharging the sewage of said City of Vern on
with said sewers," Vernon shall pay Los Angeles 50 per cent
of the cost of the main sewer, not to exceed $12,000, and
20 per cent of the cost of the lateral sewer, not to exceed
$1,300. The agreement contains no provision as to its termination.
As previously stated (ante, p. 713), pursuant to a state
permit issued in 1923, Los Angeles built a screening plant
and submarine tube at Hyperion. These facilities were used
in performance of the 1909 contract.
By the 1925 contract Vernon agrees in its use of sewers to
abide by the rules which Los Angeles prescribes for the use of
its sewers.
The 1931 agreement (which was never carried out but rather
became the subject of much controversy between the parties)
provides that Vernon shall be permitted to discharge not
more than 11.7 cubic feet of sewage per second 1 into the Los
Angeles sewer system pursuant to the 1909 contract; for this
1
The amount of sewage discharged by Vernon has always been and
now is less that 11.7 cubic feet per second.
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right Vernon is not required to pay anything; upon the execution of the agreement Vernon shall pay $234,220 for the right
to discharge additional amounts of sewage in excess of 11.7
cubic feet per second and $36,200 as its share of the cost of
construction by Los Angeles in Vern on of a relief sewer; for
sewage in excess of 11.7 cubic feet per second Vernon shall pay
Los A.ngeles such proportion of the annual cost of operation,
maintenance, replacement, and repair of the sewage disposal
facilities of Los Angeles used by Vernon as the additional
quantity of sewage discharged by Vern on bears to the total
amount of sewage discharged through the T_jos Angrles system.
·'Los Angeles shall operate, maintain and keep in good condition and repair said sewage system, outfall sewers, treatment
nlant and ocean outlet therefrom for the term of this agreement.'' The term of the agreement shall be the life of the
North Outfall Sewer. (As indicated above, Los Angeles had
completed construction of this sewer in 1924; its permit to
use this sewer was suspended in 1940 and revoked in 1943.)
Vernon did not perform its promises to pay $234,220 and
$36,200 under the 1931 agreement. In 1937 Los Angeles
filed two actions against Vernon, one for payments under the
1931 agreement and one for an injunction against discharging
;;;ewage into the Los Angeles system.
The 1938 agreement 'ltates that Los Angeles and Vern on
desire to settle all controversies as to the prior agreements and
to provide for future operation and maintenance of sewage
dispo~al facilities.
The right of Vernon to dispose of 11.7
cubic feet of sewage per second through the Los Angeles
outfall sewers is acknowledged. Los Angeles agrees to sell
and Vernon agrees to buy the right to dispose of an additional
4.3 cubic feet per second; for this right to dispose of additional
sewage Vernon agrees to pay $112,885.45 by April 1, 1939, tog·ether with specified annual payments. until 1965, totaling
$135,356.60; "in lieu of such annual payments, Vernon may
. pay the then current worth of unpaid future annual payments, discounted at the rate of 3% per annum compounded
annually.'' Vern on further agrees that if it exercises its right
to dispose of sewage in excess of 11.7 cubic feet per second, it
will pay its proportionate share, measured by the ratio of its
sewage in excess of 11.7 cubic feet per second to the total flow
of sewage through the Los Angeles outfall sewers and treatment plant, of the cost to Los Angeles of operation, repair.
replacement, construction and reconstruction of the I.~os An.
geles outfall sewers and treatment plant. The contract provides for dismissal of the 1907 actions instituted by r~os An-
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geles. 'fhere are additional provisions as to gauging stations,
a relief sewer, and other matters which need not be set out.
'l'he agreement contains no provision as to its termination.
Vernon made the $112,885.45 payment provided for by the
1938 contr&ct after it was due, with interest to compensate for
the delay; it prepaid the annual payments as the contract
provided it might do; IJOS Angeles accepted the payments in
of the obligations for which they were tendered.
[2a] 'l'he trial court in the present action determined that
pursuant to the abatement injunction the lawful existence of
the screening plant and the tube built pursuant to the 1923
permit has expired; that Los Angeles is required to build a
new plant and tube at a cost of approximately $41,000,000;
that the cost of operating and maintaining the new plant and
tube will be approximately $500,000 per annum; that Los Angeles cannot continue performance under its contracts with
Vernon ''except at an excessive and unreasonable cost; that it
is not practicable for the City of Los Angeles to continue the
performance under the terms of the contracts ... with the use
of the new ... plant and ... tube."
The trial court in the present action further determined
''That it was not intended by the plaintiff and defendant
herein that the City of Los Angeles was obligating itself, under
the terms ... of the contracts heretofore entered into between
said parties, to build ... and operate large and extensive facilities or treatment works for the purification of sewage . . . ;
that neither nor all [sic] of said contracts provide for, nor
was it contemplated by either of the parties hereto in entering
into said contracts, that the City of Los Angeles was or would
be required under said contracts to erect ... and operate a
... treatment plant costing approximately $41,000,000 for the
treatment of sewage arising within the boundaries of the City
of Vern on. "
The foregoing determinations of the trial court support the
position of Los Angeles, succinctly stated in its brief, that
"since further use of the facilities contemplated by the parties
would be unlawful and the nse of new facilities (ordered by
the Court [in the abatement action]) would be unreasonably
excessive in cost, further performance under said contracts by
Los Angeles is excused.''
[3] The controlling principles as to legal impossibility excusing performace have been long recognized in this state and
are stated in JJ1incral Park Lancl Co. v. Howard (1916), supra,
172 Cal. 289, 293, where defendants contracted to take gravel
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from
at a certain price, and it was subsequently found that the
present, could be taken
only at prohibitive
" 'A
is impossible in legal
contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can
be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.'
Beach on Contracts, § 216.) We do not
mean to intimate that the defendants could excuse themselves
by showing the existence of conditions which would make the
performance of their obligation more expensive than they had
anticipated, or which would entail a loss upon them. But
where the difference in cost is so great as here, and has the
<'ffect, as found, of making performance impracticable, the
situation is not different from that of a total absence of earth
and gravel."
[2b] As we understand the composite contracts of the
parties, and as is implicit in the trial court's findings, the
parties contemplated that there would be available for legal
use disposal facilities. whether those in existence or to be
constructed, the cost of which would not be completely disproportionate to the costs expressly referred to in those contracts. Therefore, the case is not like the cases relied upon by
Vernon where it was held that unforeseen hardship or unexpected expense did not excuse performance. (Western Industries Co. v. }Jason 111. etc. Co. (1922), 56 Cal.App. 355, 360
[205 P. 466]; Orr v. Forde (1929), 101 Cal.App. 694, 702
[282 P. 429]; see also Lloyd v. J!t~rphy (1944), 25 Cal.2d 48,
55 [153 P.2d 47] ["laws or other governmental acts that make
performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive do not
excuse the duty to perform a contractual obligation''].)
Vern on points to undisputed evidence that both before and after the parties entered into the 1938 contract offieials of Los Angeles were concerned with and attempting to
arrange for
and construction of new sewage disposal
facilities; such evidence. it says, shows that Los Angeles at
the time of the making of the contract recognized and assumed
the risk of the possibility that it would have to build expensive
new facilities. Such a conclusional finding is not impelled as
a matter of law. It is reasonable to believe that what was in
the contemplation of the parties when they negotiated the 1938
contract wa.s not the radical development of the 1943 abatement action but the working out of past and then existing
difficulties without expense running into many millions.
Vernon asserts that ''Plaintiff is entitled to an answer to the
questions: 'If the contracts are invalid, when were they invalid? By what manner did they become invalid?' These are
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the issues raised by the complaint and the answer-material
issues-and should be answered one way or the other." The
findings, conclusions, and judgment herein sufficiently resolve
these ''issues'' by the determination that conditions were such.
by the time the abatement judgment was entered, that performance of the contracts had become impracticable.
[4] Despite the language that the contracts are "terminated'' and ''invalid,'' the effect of the judgment herein is not
to determine that when performance by one party became impracticable the contracts were altogether abrogated regardless
of what performances had already been rendered by either
party. Such a determination would be incorrect. (See Ogren
v. Inner Harbor Land Co. (1927), 83 Cal.App. 197, 199 [256
P. 607].) More accurately, the judgment determines that
certain described "facilities and rights" created under the
contracts (such as the gauging stations and relief sewer
provided for by the 1938 contract) can and should be salvaged,
and although the case was not tried in such a way that all obligations between the parties could be precisely adjusted by the
judgment herein, such judgment expressly contemplates an
adjustment of those obligations; it decrees that Vernon is
liable to Los Angeles for any monetary oblig·ations accrued
under the contracts prior to the entry of judgment in the
abatement action, 2 "provided, however, that if all the benefits
received by her from the City of Los Angeles under all said
agreements prior to the entry of said judgment in said State
Abatement Action have had a fair value less than the total
payments made by her and those now owing to the City of Los
Angeles, she, Vern on, shall be credited with such excess of
payments over such value of benefits received.' ' 3
'As stated, ante, p. 719, Vernon made and Los Angeles accepted payments which discharged the two principal monetary obligations under
the 1938 contract. Wl1ether Vernon made all other, lesser payments for
various facilities and rights under such contract cannot be determined
from the record herein.
"Concerning the subject of this declaration the trial court made the
following statement in ' memorandum opinion;
"The case [for declaratory relief] was not tried by either side on a
theory that required presentation of evidence which would have enabled
the court to make a financial adjustment between the parties. Hence,
the court presently ran only suggest a program that seems to be just,
doing so with the understanding that the parties are free to work out
an amicable adjustment at variance with the court's suggestions. In
any such adjustment Vernon, it seems, should be charged with all payments accrued under the composite agreement up to the entry of judgment in the State A hatcment Action, and, if up to that time the henefits
received by her under the agreements had a fair value less than the
total cost to her, she should be credited with the difference."
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Other Contentions
Vern on urges that the contracts were validated by the
Municipal Sewer District Act of 1939 (Stats. 1939, ch. 24;
Deering's Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 5192a). Section 4 of that
act provided, ''All contracts made prior to the adoption and
passage of this act between any two or more municipal corporations . . . providing for the joint construction, use or
operation of sewer systems, or sewage disposal
are
hereby ratified and confirmed . . . '' Since further performance of the contracts is excused because of conditions which
arose subsequent to the 1939 act, we need not discuss the effect
of that act or of other, previous laws as to sewage disposal
contracts which are cited by Vernon.
[5] Vernon's second cause of action is for damages in
the amount which it is required to pay under the abatement judgment in return for its use of the Los Angeles
disposal facilities. This cause of action is based on the theory
that the negligent failure of Los Angeles to perform its contractual duty to keep its sewage disposal facilities in good
condition and carry away the sewage of Vernon was the
proximate cause of the abatement judgment against Vern on.
Since performance of such duty was excused, the cause of
action cannot be maintained.
Vern on asserts that the trial court's adjudication that it
is not entitled to specific performance may be based upon
determinations, which Vern on claims are erroneous, that it
suffered no detriment commensurate with the benefits granted
it under the contracts and that the consideration paid by
it was disproportionately small as compared with the value
of the obligations assumed by Los Angeles. The determination
that further performance is excused is independent of determinations as to adequacy of consideration, and the latter
subject need not be discussed.
In its petition for hearing by this court after decision
of the District Court of Appeal Vernon asserted for the
first time that the judgment of the trial court, if it is affirmed,
will deprive Vernon of property without due process of law.
This contention is but a variant of the argument, hereinbefore
discussed and rejected, that since the making of the contracts
there have been no developments which can excuse their
further performance.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tern.,* concurred.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

CrTY oF VERNON

v.

CITY oP Los ANGEIJES

728

[45 C.2d 710; 290 P.2d 841]

I agree
the
opinion that the trial court erred
in concluding that the decree in the abatement action determined the issues raised in this action. I am further conthat the trial court erred also in concluding
is excused from performing its contractual
of impossibility.
so well established that it requires
that the mere fact that performance of a promise is made more difficult and expensive
than the
anticipated when the contract was made,
will not excuse the promisor from his obligation to perform
his part of the contract. (Metzler v. Thye, 163 Cal. 95 [124
P. 721] ; Cottlter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal.App.
480 [10 P.2d 780]; Williston on C•mlracts (rev. eel.), vol. 6,
~ 1963; Rest., Contracts, § 467.) "Parties should be careful
about making contracts, for once made the courts will not
relieve them for light or trivial reasons. Pnblic policy is
subservecl by leaving the parties and their rights to be measured by the terms of their engagements. (California Cured
F'ruit Assn. v. Stelling, 141 Cal. 713 [75 P. 320].) They
may have made an unfortunate arrangement, but when they
have entered into it voluntarily, they are bound by it in the
absence of equitable grounds for avoidance. (Cook v. Snyder,
16 Ca1.App.2cl 587 [61 P.2cl 53].) They must be presumed
to have contracted with reference to existing conditions known
to them. (Dore v. Southern Pac. Co., 163 Cal. 182 [124 P.
817].) A person contracting with eyes open and aware of
the facts is presumed to undertake performance at the risk
of interference from agencies not expressly provided against.
(McCulloch v. Lignori, 88 Cal.App.2d 366 [199 P.2d 25] .)
Moreover, contracting parties cannot escape performance of
their undertakings because of unforeseen hardship. (Metzler
v. 1'hyc, 163 Cal. 95 [124 P. 721] .) " (12 Ca1.Jur.2cl, Contracts, § 226.) Applied to factual situations analogous to
that presented here, the rule has been stated that laws or
other governmental acts that make performance unprofitable
or more difficult or expensive do not excuse the duty to perform a contractual obligation (Aristocrat Highway Displays
v. Stricklen, 68 Cal.App.2d 788 [157 P.2cl 880] ; Western
Ind1£Stn.es Co. v. Mason Jill. etc. Co., 56 Cal.App. 355 [205
P. 466] ; McCulloch v. Liguori, 88 Cal.App.2d 366 [199 P.2cl
25] ; Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Ca1.2cl 48 [153 P.2cl 47]; Sample
v. F'resno Flume etc. Co., 129 CaL 222 [61 P. 1085] ; Klauber
v. San Diego Street Car Co., 95 Cal. 353 [30 P. 555] ).
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Looking at the present factual situation, we note that a
governmental act-the abatement action-has caused Los Angeles to make certain expenditures, and has made performance
by Los Angeles of its contractual obligations more expensive.
Applying the general rule to this factual situation, we would
conclude that Los Angeles is not excused from performing its
contractual obligations, and that Los Angeles therefore has
no right to retain all of the payment made by Vernon under
court order to help finance the construction of a facility
whereby Los Angeles may legally perform its contractual
obligation.
The rule has developed in modern times that supervening
impossibility will, in proper cases, excuse a promisor's failure
to perform. Unusual or unexpected expense does not establish impossibility of performance. (Metzler v. Thye, 163 Cal.
95 [124 P. 721] ; Glens Falls Indern. Co. v. Perscallo, 96
Cal.App.2d 799 [216 P.2d 567].) Failure to perform may
be excused, howeycr, when the added cost is so great as to
have the effect of making performance impracticable. In
legal contemplation a thing is impossible when not practicable,
and a thing is impracticable when it can be done only at an
excessive and unreasonable cost (Mineral Park Land Co. v.
Howard, 172 Cal. 289 [156 P. 458, L.R.A. 1916F 1]).
The following characteristics should be particularly noted
in regard to this defense of legal impossibility: First, it
operates to excuse a nonperforming obligor from liability
for his failure to perform. Second, it operates only when
performance of the obligor's part of the contract is impracticable. Third, the unanticipated expense which will render
performance impracticable must be very much greater (in
the Mineral Park case it was 10 or 12 times greater) than
the expected or usual cost of performance. With these
characteristics in mind, it is evident that the majority opinion
has erred in supporting the trial court's judgment on the
basis of legal impossibility.
Among the contractual obligations of Los Angeles, which
the majority opinion says are excused, is a duty to accept
at designated places, and to dispose of a specified quantity
(up to 16 cubic feet per second) of sewage from Vernon.
It should be noted that this duty was performed by Los
Angeles up until the time of commencement of this action;
it is presumably being performed by Los Angeles while this
ease is pending in the courts; and it will assuredly be performed in the future, after a decision is rendered in this case.
It is obvious, then, that the doctrine of legal impossibility
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as here applied by the majority does not excuse an obligor
from liability for failure to perform a contractual duty;
instead that doctrine is employed by the majority to rewrite
the contract between these parties. r,os Angeles will continue
to perform the services which it undertook to perform by this
eon tract; Vern on will continue to dispose of its sewage at
on the I1os Angeles outfall sewer; but
Vernon, the obligee, will be required to pay more money,
now and in the future, for this continuation of performance
of the contractual obligations of Los Angeles.
I am aware of no prior decision of this or any other court
in which the doctrine of legal impossibility has been applied
to increase the consideration to be paid by the promisee
while recognizing that the promisor will continue to perform
as before. By the same token, I can fiud neither law nor
logic to support a decision which terms "impracticable" or
"impossible" of performance, a contract which both parties
and this court recognize as having been performed and is
expected to be performed for an indefinite period in the
future. This situation comes as near approaching a legal
paradox as any which has come under my observation.
As an additional matter, careful examination of the record
in this case raises a question as to whether the cost of performing the contract, using the new facilities, is substantially
disproportionate to the anticipated cost of performance. The
majority opinion refers to certain payments made by Vernon
to Los Angeles. The total sum which Vern on had paid up
to the time of trial for the use of the facilities of the Los
Angeles sewer system was $296,801.50, in addition to the
granting of flowage rights through Vernon. The majority
opinion then refers to the trial court's finding that Los Angeles is required to build a new treatment plant and tube
at a cost of about $41,000,000, and that operation and maintenance of these facilities will cost about $500,000 per year.
But these figures, juxtaposed in the majority opinion, are
misleading. The figures "$41.000,000" and "$500,000" have
but slight bearing on the cost to Los Angeles of performing
its contractual obligation to Vernon.
If this were a proper case for application of the doctrine
of legal impossibility (if Vernon were seeking damages for
a refusal by Los Angeles to accept any sewage from Vern on),
the figure which would be computed to determine whether
performance was unreasonably or excessively expensive would
be the increased cost of performing this contract. Presumably
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the cost of performance before the advent of the abatemen·
action was not disproportionate to the
consideration paid by Vernon. To compute the increase 111
cost, one must recognize the additional facts that Los
for
is building a sewage disposal plant with
million gallons per day; that 10 million
this capacity is allotted to Vernon. If the
and constructed without allotment of
it would still have capacity for 250 million
The increased cost of performing the contract is the difference in cost of construction between a 260-million-gallon
per day plant and a 250-million-gallon per day plant. What
this difference would be is impossible to determine from the
record before us. It requires no engineer, however, to deduce
that the cost of construction would not increase in direct
proportion to the increase in capacity; the structural differences between a 250-million-gallon per day plant and a 260million-gallon per day plant would presumably be slight.
It is clear, at any rate, that the increase in cost attributable
to making the plant large enough to take care of Vern on's
sewage, and thus the increased cost of performing the Vernon
sewage contract, would not be 10 or 12 times as great as the
approximately $300,000 which it would have cost to perform
the contract if the abatement action had not intervened.
Another point on which I am convinced the majority
opinion is in error relates to V rrnon 's second cause of action,
on the theory of negligence. The majority opinion states:
''Vern on's second cause of action is for damages in the amount
which it is required to pay under the abatement judgment
in return for its use of the Los Angeles disposal facilities.
This cause of action is based on the theory that the negligent
failure of Los Angeles to perform its contractual duty to
keep its sewage disposal facilities in good condition and carry
away the sewage of Vern on was the proximate cause of the
abatement judgment against Vernon. Since performance of
such duty was excused, the cause of action cannot be maintained." (Emphasis added.)
On this point the majority opinion appears to be inconsistent with itself. It is beyond dispute that a negligence
action may be predicatrd on the breach of a duty arising
out of contract. (L. B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39
Cal.2d 56 [244 P.2d 385].) If the brPaeh which causes the
damage and gives rise to the cause of action occurs while
the contractual duty is subsisting, can plaintiff's right to
maintain a cause of action for that breach be destroyed by
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later occurrence of events v;hich are held to excuse the
of the
not.
of the majority opinion is that Los An, performance of duties under the contracts is excused
because of excessiye or unreasonable expense occasioned by
the decree in the abatement action. But Vernon seeks relief
by way of damages for the
negligent operation of
the sewage disposal facilities which brought about the abatement action. In other words, Vernon alleges a breach of
eontractual duties by Los Angeles before the existence of
the conditions which are held in the majority opinion to
excuse performance of those duties. Clearly the breach of
duty alleged by Vernon in its second cause of action is a
sufficient basis for maintenance of that cause of action even
if the majority opinion were correct in holding the duty
to be later excused. In other words, it was a breach of duty
0n the part of Los Angeles which brought about the condition
on which itR defense of impoRsibility of performance is predicated.
The pleadings relating to the second cause of action raised
the issues (1) whether Los Angeles owed a contractual duty
to maintain the old treatment plan and ocean outlet in good
repair; (2) whether Los Angeles breached that duty by negligence, carelessness and mismanagement in the operation and
maintenance of the treatment plant and ocean outlet; and
( 3) whether such breach, if any, was the direct and proximate
cause of damage to Vern on. Much of the testimony in the
trial court related to these issues. The failure of the trial
court to make direct findings on these issues was prejudicial
error. (Baggs v. Smith, 53 Cal. 88; Taylor v. Taylor, 192
Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074]; Strong v. Strong, 22
Cal.2d 540 [140 P.2d 386] ; Elliott v. Bertsch, 59 Cal.App.2d
543 [139 P.2d 332] ; Mayer v. Beondo, 83 Cal.App.2d 665
[189 P.2d 327, 190 P.2d 23]; Chamberlain v. Abeles, 88 Cal.
App.2d 291 [198 P.2d 927]; Flennaugh v. Heinrich, 89
Cal.App.2d 214 r200 P.2d 580] .)
The trial court's finding of fact relative to the second cause
of action reads as follows: "Insofar as the allegations of
paragraphs III, IV, V and VI of said second cause of
action purport to assert any present obligation of the City of
l;os Angeles, or any present right of the City of Vernon,
arising from any or all of the aforesaid contracts andjor
from any conduct on the part of the City of Los Angeles,
each of said allegations is untrue. It is not true that any
he
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negligence andjor carelessness or other conduct of the defendant was the proximate cause of the judgment entered
against Vernon in said State Abatement Action, or of the
order of the court which, in effect, required Vernon to pay
the sum of $901,250.00 or any other sum as its proportionate
share of the new treatment plant and/or submarine outfall
andjor any other facility for sewage disposal, which said
judgment required the City of Los Angeles to construct;
and it is not true that plaintiff will be damaged in said or
any sum by compliance with the orders or any order of said
judgment. To the contrary, plaintiff has been benefited by
the compliance with said judgment on the part of the defendant, and plaintiff has been and will be benefited by said compliance to an extent greater in fair monetary value than
the total of all sums which she, Vern on, has been or will be
required by said judgment to pay."
This :finding does not purport to deal with the issue of a
contractual duty owed by Los Angeles to Vernon during the
period prior to the judgment in the abatement action. There
is no :finding on the factual question whether Los Angeles
breached its contractual duty. The :finding that Vernon will
not be damaged by compliance with the abatement judgment,
but will instead be benefited, is obviously based on the trial
court's erroneous conclusion that Los Angeles is excused from
performing the contract. If Vern on is required to pay for a
service which Los Angeles is contractually bound to render,
obviously Vernon will be damaged to the extent of the value
of the service, which damage was suffered by Vern on as the
result of the failure of Los Angeles to perform its contractual
duty by operating its sewage disposal facilities in such a
manner as to create a public nuisance which necessitated
the abatement action. It should be noted that Vernon had
no power to control the manner of operation of the disposal
fncilities.
In my opinion Los Angeles should be held to the terms of
the contract which it made with Vernon. Vern on's contractual right to flow 11.7 cubic feet per second of sewage
into the Los Angeles sewer system without further payment
,;hould be upheld. Vernon should have the further right to
flow an additional 4.3 cubic feet per second of sewage into
the Los Angeles sewer system, subject to payment of a proportionate share of the sewage disposal cost as provided in
the contract. Los Angeles should be ordered to return to
Vernon so much of the payment made by Vern on pursuant
to the decree in the abatement action as is attributable to
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the 16 cubic feet per second flow whieh IJOS Angeles is contractually bound to accept.
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment.
Traynor,

j .,

concurred.

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied
5, 1956. MeComb, J., did not participate therein.
pro tern.,* participated therein in place of Shenk, J.
J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the
should be granted.

[L. A. No. 23700.
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Bray, J
Carter,
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CITY OF OXNAHD, Petitioner, v. E'l'HEL DALE,
as City Clerk, etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] Public Securities-Issuance-Mandamus.-Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel city officers to sign revenue bonds
which the city proposes to issue pursuant to the Revenue Bond
Act of 1941 (Gov. Code, § 54300) if the proposed issue meets
the requirements of the law, since the acts demanded are
ministerial duties.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Debt Limitation-Obligations Payable Out of Special Fund.-Generally, a constitutional provision such as Const., art. XI, § 18, limiting the amount of indebtedness which a city or other political subdivision or agency
may incur, is not violated by revenue bonds or other obligations which are payable solely from a special fund, provided
the governmental body is not liable to maintain the special
fund out of its general funds, or by tax levies, should the
special fund prove insufilcient.
[3] !d.-Debt Limitation-Obligations Payable Out of Special
Fund.-Revenue bonds payable solely from a special fund
are not considered an indebtedness or liability of the political
subdivision or agency issuing them within the meaning of the
debt limitation of Const., art. XI, § 18.
[1) See Cal.Jur., Public Securities, § 11; Am.Jur., Mandamus,
§ 162.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 177 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Municipal Corporations, § 468 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1) Public Securities, § 12; [2-10) Municipal Corporations, § 174.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

